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La manipulation stratégique des règles de vote : une étude expérimentale


Author Info

  • Virginie Béhue

    (CREM, Université de Caen)

  • Pierre Favardin

    (CREM, Université de Caen)

  • Dominique Lepelley

    (CERESUR, Université de la Réunion)


L’analyse théorique de la vulnérabilité des règles de vote aux comportements stratégiques montre que le caractère plus ou moins manipulable d’une règle dépend du concept d’équilibre auquel on se réfère. Une question cruciale est de savoir si l’on doit ou non tenir compte des possibilités qu’ont les électeurs de réagir en présence d’une menace de manipulation. Nous étudions cette question à l’aide d’une approche expérimentale. Nos résultats tendent à valider empiriquement la notion de réaction.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2009044.

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Length: 14
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2009044

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Related research

Keywords: choix social; règles de vote; manipulation stratégique; expériences;

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Cited by:
  1. Karine Van der Straeten & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & André Blais, 2010. "Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 435-472, September.
  2. André Blais & Jean-François Laslier & Nicolas Sauger & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2008. "Sincere, strategic, and heuristic voting under four election rules: An experimental study," Working Papers, HAL hal-00335046, HAL.


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