Exports and Wages: Discriminating between the Sources of Rents
AbstractWhen do exports lead to rents ? And when are they shared with employees ? This paper proposes a double empirical test that deals with this question, based on a mix of rent sharing theories and Cournot Oligopoly. We find that most of the OECD exporting activities are associated with some rent that are shared with employees. However, we also show that the destination of sales matter, as rents seem to originate mostly from exporting to other OECD economies or, to a lesser extent, selling to own markets. Exports to developing countries’ however, seem to be associated with positive rents only in a small minority of industries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2009012.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2009
Date of revision:
International trade; rents; wages;
Other versions of this item:
- Lionel Fontagné & Daniel Mirza, 2009. "Exports and Wages: Discriminating between the Sources of Rents," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 75(1), pages 35-61.
- F1 - International Economics - - Trade
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
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