Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Welfarism and Axiomatic Bargaining Theory

Contents:

Author Info

  • John E. ROEMER

    (University of California)

Abstract

Consider the domain of economic environments E whose typical element is ξ = (U₁, U₂, Ω, ω*), where ui are Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, Ω is a set of lotteries on a fixed finite set of alternatives, and ω ϵ Ω. A mechanism f associates to each ξ a lottery f(ξ) in Ω. Formulate the natural version of Nash's axioms, from his bargaining solution, for mechanisms on this domain, (e.g., IIA says that if ξ = (U₁, U₂, Δ ⊂ Ω, and f ∈ It is shown that the Nash axioms (Pareto, symmetry, IIA, invariance w. r. t. cardinal transformations of the utility functions) hardly restrict the behavior of the mechanism at all. In particular, for any integer M, choose M environments ξi, i = 1,..., M, and choose a Pareto optimal lottery ωi ∈ Ωi, restricted only so that no axiom is directly contradicted by these choices. Then there is a mechanism f for which f (ξi) = ωi, which satisfies all the axioms, and is continuous on E.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40723929
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 1990032.

as in new window
Length: 15
Date of creation: 01 Sep 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:1990032

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Fax: +32 10473945
Email:
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/ires
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. d’ASPREMONT, Claude & GEVERS, Louis, 2001. "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," CORE Discussion Papers 2001040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Marco Mariotii, 1996. "Fair bargains: distributive justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Game Theory and Information 9611003, EconWPA, revised 27 Nov 1996.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:1990032. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sebastien SCHILLINGS).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.