Welfarism and Axiomatic Bargaining Theory
AbstractConsider the domain of economic environments E whose typical element is ξ = (U₁, U₂, Ω, ω*), where ui are Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, Ω is a set of lotteries on a fixed finite set of alternatives, and ω ϵ Ω. A mechanism f associates to each ξ a lottery f(ξ) in Ω. Formulate the natural version of Nash's axioms, from his bargaining solution, for mechanisms on this domain, (e.g., IIA says that if ξ = (U₁, U₂, Δ ⊂ Ω, and f ∈ It is shown that the Nash axioms (Pareto, symmetry, IIA, invariance w. r. t. cardinal transformations of the utility functions) hardly restrict the behavior of the mechanism at all. In particular, for any integer M, choose M environments ξi, i = 1,..., M, and choose a Pareto optimal lottery ωi ∈ Ωi, restricted only so that no axiom is directly contradicted by these choices. Then there is a mechanism f for which f (ξi) = ωi, which satisfies all the axioms, and is continuous on E.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 1990032.
Date of creation: 01 Sep 1990
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- d’ASPREMONT, Claude & GEVERS, Louis, 2001.
"Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2001040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
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- Marco Mariotii, 1996. "Fair bargains: distributive justice and Nash Bargaining Theory," Game Theory and Information 9611003, EconWPA, revised 27 Nov 1996.
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