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Optimal Debt Structure with Multiple Creditors

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Author Info
Patrick Bolton
David S Scharfstein

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Abstract

Within an optimal contracting framework we analyse some important aspects of debt structure: the number of creditors a company borrows from; the allocation of security interests among creditors; and inter-creditor covenants that govern renegotiation of debt contracts. The key to our analysis is the idea that debt structure affects the outcome of debt renegotiation following a default. Debt structures that lead to ineffecient renegotiation are beneficial in that they deter default, but they are also costly if default is beyond a manager's control. The optimal debt structure balances these effects. We characterize how the optimal debt structure depends on firm characteristics such as technology, credit rating and the market for its assets.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG in its series CEPR Financial Markets Paper with number 0032.

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Date of creation: Mar 1993
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Availability: in print
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprfm:0032

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Keywords: Debt Renegotiation; Security Interests; Priority; Voting Monitoring; Exclusivity;

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  1. Douglas W. Diamond, 1994. "Corporate capital structure: the control roles of bank and public debt with taxes and costly bankruptcy," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 11-37. [Downloadable!]
  2. Judith A. Chevalier & David S. Scharfstein, 1994. "Capital Market Imperfections and Countercyclical Markups: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 4614, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Michael Manove & A. Jorge Padilla & Marco Pagano, 1998. "Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," CSEF Working Papers 10, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Gordon M Phillips & Vojislav Maksimovic, 1996. "Efficiency of Bankrupt Firms and Industry Conditions: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 96-12, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau. [Downloadable!]
  5. Robert H. Gertner & David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, 1994. "Internal versus External Capital Markets," NBER Working Papers 4776, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Zakolyukina Anastasia, 2006. "Bankrtuptcy in Russia: External Management Performance," EERC Working Paper Series 06-09e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS. [Downloadable!]
  7. Vittorio Corbo & José Tessada, 2003. "Modeling a Small Open Economy: The Case of Chile," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 243, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
  8. Demirguc-Kunt, Asl1 & Maksimovic, Vojislav, 1996. "Institutions, financial markets, and firms'choice of debt maturity," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1686, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Álvaro García & Andrea Repetto & Sergio Rodríguez & Rodrigo Valdés, 2003. "Concentration, Hold-Up and Information Revelation in Bank Lending: Evidence From Chilean Firms," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 226, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
  10. J. Rodrigo Fuentes & Luis Antonio Ahumada, 2003. "Banking Industry and Monetary Policy: an Overview," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 240, Central Bank of Chile. [Downloadable!]
  11. Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN & Erik BERGLÖF & Gérard ROLAND, 2003. "Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 03.13, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP. [Downloadable!]
  12. Caprio, Gerard, Jr & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, 1998. "The Role of Long-Term Finance: Theory and Evidence," World Bank Research Observer, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 171-89, August. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Efraim Benmelech & Mark J. Garmaise & Tobias Moskowitz, 2004. "Do Liquidation Values Affect Financial Contracts? Evidence from Commercial Loan Contracts and Zoning Regulation," NBER Working Papers 11004, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Gilles Chemla & Antoine Faure Grimaud, 1996. "Dynamic Adverse Selection and Debt," Economics Working Papers 196, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1996. [Downloadable!]
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