Asymmetric Broadband Wholesale Regulation
AbstractDue to technological convergence, multiple infrastructures can now offer broadband or triple-play services, while the existing access regulation is based on a single essential network. We show that continued asymmetric access regulation of one network does not control sufficiently for market power and benefits the unregulated network, and that symmetric regulation would lead to higher consumer surplus. Furthermore, the whole setup of access regulation may not be viable in the long run if regulatory constraints provide strong first-mover advantages to the unregulated network.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 8399.
Date of creation: May 2011
Date of revision:
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-05-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-NET-2011-05-30 (Network Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-05-30 (Regulation)
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