Bargaining with a Composite Player: An Application to the Uruguay Round of GATT Negotiations
AbstractThe paper analyses a situation in which negotiations take place between a party consisting of a single decision-maker and a party consisting of a group of two decision-makers. The latter, in setting its proposal to the opponent party, may act cooperatively or non-cooperatively within itself. The model seems to be applicable to many cases such as wage negotiations with a group of different workers' unions, disarmament negotiations with a group of allied countries, etc. In the paper, however, the model is directly applied to the case of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. In this case the authors' conjecture is that much of the difficulty currently experienced in reaching an agreement stems from the often non-cooperative nature of the preliminary agreement within the European Community required before it can arrive at a definite proposal for negotiation with other countries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 685.
Date of creation: Jul 1992
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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- Vanzetti, David, 1996. "The next round: Game theory and public choice perspectives," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4-5), pages 461-477.
- L. Alan Winters, 2000. "Regionalism and Multilateralism in the Twenty-First Century," IDB Publications 8749, Inter-American Development Bank.
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