Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Can Central Banks Go Broke?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Buiter, Willem H

Abstract

Central banks can go broke and have done so, although mainly in developing countries. The conventional balance sheet of the central bank is uninformative about the financial resources it has at its disposal and about its ability to act as an effective lender of last resort and market marker of last resort. As long as central banks don’t have significant foreign exchange-denominated liabilities or index-linked liabilities, it will always be possible for the central bank to ensure its solvency though monetary issuance (seigniorage). However, the scale of the recourse to seigniorage required to safeguard central bank solvency may undermine price stability. In addition, there are limits to the amount of real resources the central bank can appropriate by increasing the issuance of nominal base money. For both these reasons, it may be desirable for the Treasury to recapitalise the central bank should the central bank suffer a major capital loss as a result of its lender of last resort and market maker of last resort activities. The fiscal authorities of the Euro Area should as a matter of urgency agree on a formula for dividing the fiscal burden of recapitalising the European Central Bank/Eurosystem, should the need arise.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP6827.asp
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6827.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: May 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6827

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

Related research

Keywords: central bank insolvency; lender of last resort; market maker of last resort; recapitalising central banks;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Willem H. Buiter, 2007. "Seigniorage," NBER Working Papers 12919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Padoa-Schioppa, Tommaso, 1999. "EMU and Banking Supervision," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 295-308, July.
  3. Charles Goodhart, 1999. "Recent Developments in Central Banking: Some Special Features of the Monetary Policy Committee and of the European System of Central Banks," FMG Special Papers sp118, Financial Markets Group.
  4. Willem H. Buiter, 2005. "New Developments in Monetary Economics: Two ghosts, Two Eccentricities, a Fallacy, a Mirage and a Mythos," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(502), pages C1-C31, 03.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Körner, Finn Marten & Ehnts, Dirk H., 2013. "Chinese monetary policy – from theory to practice," MPRA Paper 44264, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Stefan Kooths & Björn van Roye, 2012. "Euro Area: Single Currency - National Money Creation," Kiel Working Papers 1787, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  3. Georg ERBER, 2010. "The Problem Of Money Illusion In Economics," Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Financial Management and Accounting Craiova, vol. 5(3(13)/Fal), pages 196-216.
  4. De Grauwe, Paul & Ji,Yuemei, 2012. "What Germany should fear most is its own fear: An analysis of Target2 and current account imbalances," CEPS Papers 7280, Centre for European Policy Studies.
  5. Kenneth N. Kuttner, 2010. "The Fed's response to the financial crisis: Pages from the BOJ playbook, or a whole new ball game?," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 6(3), pages 407-430, March.
  6. Philipp Bagus & Markus H. Schiml, 2010. "A Cardiograph of the Dollar´s Quality: Qualitative Easing and the Federal Reserve Balance Sheet During the Subprime Crisis," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2010(3), pages 195-217.
  7. Ansgar Belke & Thorsten Polleit, 2010. "How much fiscal backing must the ECB have? The euro area is not (yet) the Philippines," Economie Internationale, CEPII research center, issue 124.
  8. Kooths, Stefan & van Roye, Björn, 2012. "Nationale Geldschöpfung im Euroraum: Mechanismen, Defekte, Therapie," Kiel Discussion Papers 508/509, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  9. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Munich Reprints in Economics 20245, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6827. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.