Monopoly, Tying and Reciprocity: An Application to International Trade
AbstractThis paper sees countertrade as a means by which the PCPEs (previously centrally planned economies) and LDCs extract some of the monopoly profits from firms in OECD countries to subsidize their exports. Viewed in this way, countertrade is an exchange of market entry for marketing assistance in which the PCPEs and LDCs effectively shift the terms of trade in their favour. Based on a new sample of 230 countertrade contracts, which have been signed between firms in OECD countries and PCPEs and LDCs in the period between 1984 and 1988, the paper estimates the likelihood of such terms-of-trade change as a function of the market power of OECD firms, the extent to which goods offered by the PCPEs/LDCs in the contract reflect comparative advantage, and the information available in the bargaining over the terms of the contract. The data are consistent with the view that countertrade is used by the PCPEs/LDCs as a vehicle to reduce the effective price of their imports. Since it is equivalent to an import tax cum export subsidy in the presence of foreign market power, countertrade raises the welfare of the PCPEs/LDCs by allowing them to recapture some of the monopoly rents the OECD firms are extracting from their consumers in PCPEs/LDCs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 609.
Date of creation: Nov 1991
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- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- P42 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Productive Enterprises; Factor and Product Markets; Prices
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- Caves, Richard E & Marin, Dalia, 1992.
"Countertrade Transactions: Theory and Evidence,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(414), pages 1171-83, September.
- Caves, Richard E. & Marin, Dalia, 1992. "Countertrade Transactions: Theory and Evidence," Munich Reprints in Economics 3111, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Caves, R.E. & Marin, D., 1992. "Countertrade Transactions: Theory and Evidence," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1599, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Caves, Richard E. & Marin, Dalia, 1992. "Countertrade transactions: theory and evidence," Munich Reprints in Economics 19952, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Amann, Erwin & Marin, Dalia, 1994. "Risk-Sharing in International Trade," Munich Reprints in Economics 3110, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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