Import Surveillance as a Strategic Trade Policy
AbstractThe EC policy of import surveillance entails the public announcement that henceforth the Commission will collect detailed statistics on particular import flows. The imposition of surveillance, it is argued, will change exporters' perceptions about the probabilities of future import controls. When it anticipates future restrictions, a competitive export industry is likely to increase sales as each firm tries to gain a higher share of any future quota, but an oligopolistic industry may well curtail exports in the hope of avoiding further, more restrictive policy. This paper tests these hypotheses on EC import data and finds them largely supported. It argues that this result constitutes evidence of strategic behaviour.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 404.
Date of creation: Mar 1990
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- Siroën, Jean-Marc, . "Choix de la politique commerciale dans le cas de la concurrence imparfaite," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6629, Paris Dauphine University.
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