Downstream Competition, Foreclosure, and Vertical Integration
AbstractThis paper analyses the impact of competition among downstream firms on an upstream firm's payoff and on its incentive to vertically integrate when firms on both segments negotiate optimal contracts. We argue that tougher competition decreases the downstream industry profit, but improves the upstream firm's negotiation position. In particular, the upstream firm is better off encouraging competition when the downstream firms have high bargaining power. We derive implications on the interplay between vertical integration and competition among the downstream firms. The mere possibility of vertical integration may constitute a barrier to entry and may trigger strategic horizontal spin-offs or mergers. We discuss the impact of upstream competition on our results.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2647.
Date of creation: Dec 2000
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
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- Bru, Lluís & de Haro, José-Manuel Ordóñez & Faulí-Oller, Ramon, 2001.
"Divisionalization in Vertical Structures,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gilles Chemla & Gilles Chemla, 2003. "Downstream Competition, Foreclosure and Vertical Integration," Post-Print halshs-00679847, HAL.
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