This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Corruption And Competition In Public Market Auctions

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Compte, Olivier
Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane
Verdier, Thierry

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of corruption on competition in government procurement auctions. Our assumption is that the bureaucrat (i.e. the agent that administers the market), if corrupt, may provide a favour in exchange for a bribe. The favour we consider in most of our analysis is the opportunity to readjust a bid. We show that a key effect of corruption is to facilitate collusion in price between firms. This can result in high public spending and inefficient allocation. We discuss the effect of other forms of bureaucratic discretion in the procurement process and analyse conditions under which unilateral anti-corruption controls may restore price competition.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP2434.asp
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 2434.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Apr 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:2434

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: Auction Procedures; Collusion; Controls; Corruption;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Susanne Büchner & Andreas Freytag & Luis G. Gonzalez & Werner Güth, 2006. "Bribery and Public Procurement - An Experimental Study -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-30, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Yvan Lengwiler & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2005. "Bid Rigging – An Analysis of Corruption in Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Libor Dušek & Andreas Ortman & Lubomír Lízal, 2005. "Understanding Corruption And Corruptibility Through Experiments," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2005(2), pages 147-162. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS indexes over 800000 items of research in Economics alone.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.