The Winner's Curse and the Failure of the Law of Demand
AbstractWe usually assume increases in supply, allocation by rationing, and exclusion of potential buyers will never raise prices. But all of these activities raise the expected price in an important set of cases when common-value assets are sold. Furthermore, when we make the assumptions needed to rule out these ‘anomalies’ when buyers are symmetric, small asymmetries among buyers necessarily cause the anomalies to reappear.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1754.
Date of creation: Nov 1997
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Matthew Shum, 1998. "The Econometrics Of English Auctions," Working Papers mshum-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.