Regionalism and the Rest of the World: The Irrelevance of the Kemp-Wan Theorem
AbstractMany commentators purport to use the Kemp-Wan Theorem to discuss the effects of regional integration schemes on non-member countries, and to operationalize the theorem in terms of the share of member countries' imports from non-members. This paper shows that Kemp and Wan (1976) say nothing about changes in non-member welfare and that the latter is more closely related to non-members' imports than to their shares of members' markets. The paper suggests that a new approach to this issue is required.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 1316.
Date of creation: Jan 1996
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- Winters, L Alan, 1997. "Regionalism and the Rest of the World: The Irrelevance of the Kemp-Wan Theorem," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 228-34, April.
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
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