Emissions trading and the European electricity market: Consequences of emissions trading on prices of electricity and competitiveness of basic industries
AbstractIn 2001 the European Commission proposed the introduction of a European system of trading in greenhouse gases. This proposal is currently subject to fierce debates. Opponents to the proposal of the Commission do not question the efficiency effects of emissions trading in general. The economic benefits of trading in emission permits compared to other instruments for climate policy are broadly recognized. Likely distributional effects of emissions trading, however, are the origin of fierce controversies. The European Commission has proposed a method of direct allocation while others, like representatives of large industries, plead for an indirect method. In the former approach, permits are distributed directly to the group of firms that emit the gases. End-users of energy receive their permits in the latter method. Emitters and end-users of energy are the same group of firms only when use of energy coincides directly with emissions. This is valid for the burning of natural gas for instance, but not for the generation and consumption of electricity. Emissions of carbon dioxide result from electricity production when power is generated by means of coal, oil, or gas fired plants. Consumption of electricity does not generate any emissions. Consequently, the direct allocation of permits implies that power plants receive the permits while electricity users obtain them when the indirect approach is followed. The debate on the method of allocation concerns its effects on the price of electricity and the competitiveness of large users of electricity. Questions that have to be answered are: Â‘will power producers raise their prices if they obtain their permits free of charge?', and Â‘to which extent does a rise in electricity price affect industries such as Steel, and Aluminium?'. The Netherlands' Committee Â‘Allocating emission permits" has asked the CPB to answer these questions.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in its series CPB Memorandum with number 54.
Date of creation: Jan 2003
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L6 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing
- Q21 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-01-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2003-01-12 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-EEC-2003-01-12 (European Economics)
- NEP-ENE-2003-01-12 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-IND-2003-01-12 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2003-01-13 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-RMG-2003-01-12 (Risk Management)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pablo del Río & Javier Carrillo-Hermosilla & Totti Könnölä & Carlos Suárez, 2008. "Challenges and opportunities of a post-Kyoto mitigation regime: a survey of the European electricity sector," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 13(8), pages 863-885, October.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.