Strategic competition with public infrastructure; ineffective and unwelcome?
AbstractCountries invest in international infrastructure in an effort to attract firms. Acquiring the position of a hub would make this effort successful. We use a model of international trade with monopolistic competition, increasing returns to scale and transport costs to analyse policy competition through infrastructure investment. For a small or backward country the strategic effect of attracting firms is less important than for large or advanced countries. A country that acquires a hub-position sees its welfare improve. The other countries may gain or lose; they benefit from cheaper international trade, but suffer from the relocation of firms. In the case of line infrastructure the spoke countries will invest to eradicate the hub position, whereas in the case of point infrastructure they will not. Policy competition is more likely to deliver too much infrastructure investment when transport costs are low and the strategic effect is more important. A globalising world may thus call for international co-ordination.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in its series CPB Discussion Paper with number 8.
Date of creation: Jul 2002
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-07-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-2002-07-31 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2002-07-31 (Public Economics)
- NEP-REG-2002-07-31 (Regulation)
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- Machiel van Dijk & Richard Nahuis & DaniÃ«l Waagmeester, 2005.
"Does public service broadcasting serve the public? The future of television in the changing media landscape,"
CPB Discussion Paper
43, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
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- Machiel van Dijk & Richard Nahuis & Daniel Waagmeester, 2005. "Does Public Service Broadcasting Serve The Public? The Future Of Television In The Changing Media Landscape," Working Papers 05-13, Utrecht School of Economics.
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