How lotteries outperform auctions for charity
AbstractIn their recent paper Goeree et al. (2005) determine that all-pay auctions are better for fundraising activities than lotteries. We show that the introduction of asymmetry among valuations with complete information could reverse this result. Complete information seems well suited to some charity environments.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2009049.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2009
Date of revision:
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all-pay auctions; charity; complete information; lotteries;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-03-28 (All new papers)
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