Ad valorem and per unit taxation in an oligopoly model
AbstractThis paper compares the welfare effects of ad valorem and per unit commodity taxation, in a model of oligopolistic interaction. Our main result is that, when the number of consumers is sufficiently high, per unit taxes welfare dominate ad valorem taxes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2000054.
Date of creation: 00 Nov 2000
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Imperfect competition; strategic market game; commodity taxation.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H22 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Incidence
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
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