Relative utilitarianism an improved axiomatisation
AbstractIn a framework of preferences over lotteries, we show that an axiom system consisting of weakened versions of Arrow's axioms has a unique solution. "Relative Utilitarianism" consists of first normalising individual von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities between 0 and 1 and then summing them. This axiomatisation largely supersedes the one in Dhillon and Mertens (1993).
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1996055.
Date of creation: 07 Nov 1996
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
Axiomatisation; Social Choice; Social Welfare Function; Utilitarianism; Welfarism; Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem; Expected Utility;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dhillon, Amrita & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1997.
"An impossibility theorem with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences,"
Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 305-309, November.
- Dhillon, A. & Mertens, J.-F., . "An impossiblity theorem with von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1292, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.