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Self-Fulfilling Mechanisms in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

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  • FORGES, Françoise

    (CORE, Universite catholique de Louvain and Chercheur qualifie au F.N.R.S)

  • MINELLI , Enrico

    (CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

We consider the class of two-person non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games with incomplete information where Nash equilibria have been characterized, namely games with lack of information on one side and games with private values. We show that in these models, every Nash equilibrium payoff can be achieved by means of a selffulfilling mechanism, which receives a message from every player at the beginning of the game and then transmits a public signal. This signal can be interpreted as a characteristic of the players' strategies. The self-fulfilling property means that given the signal, there are equilibrium strategies whose characteristic coincides with the signal.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 1994058.

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Date of creation: 01 Oct 1994
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1994058

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Keywords: communication equilibrium; incomplete information; Nash equilibrium; repeated game;

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