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Politics and the Fed

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  • Allan Meltzer

Abstract

In the standard policy model, a policymaker optimizes the welfare of a representative agent. In practice, policies are chosen in a political process by agents elected by voters. Drawing on evidence from my two-volume history of the Federal Reserve, the paper reports many examples of decisions influenced by political pressures. The history shows that the meaning of the independence of the Federal Reserve changed over time reflecting political influences.

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File URL: https://student-3k.tepper.cmu.edu/gsiadoc/wp/2010-E30.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business in its series GSIA Working Papers with number 2010-E30.

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Handle: RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:-2026188177

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Postal: Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
Web page: http://www.tepper.cmu.edu/

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Web: http://student-3k.tepper.cmu.edu/gsiadoc/GSIA_WP.asp

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Cited by:
  1. Michael Berlemann & Soeren Enkelmann & Torben Kuhlenkasper, 2013. "Unraveling the Relationship between Presidential Approval and the Economy - A Multi-Dimensional Semi-Parametric Approach," Working Paper Series in Economics 273, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.

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