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One Sided Matching: Choice Selection With Rival Uncertain Outcomes

Author

Listed:
  • David B. Johnson
  • Matthew Webb

    (University of Calgary)

Abstract

We examine decision making in the context of one sided matching: where individuals simultaneously submit several applications to vacancies, each match has an exogenous probability of forming, but each applicant can only fill one vacancy. In these environments individuals choose among interdependent, rival, uncertain outcomes. We design an experiment that has individuals choose a varying number of interdependent lotteries from a fixed set. We find that: 1) with few choices, subjects make safer and riskier choices, 2) subjects behave in a manner inconsistent with expected utility maximizing behavior. We discuss these findings in the context of college application decisions.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • David B. Johnson & Matthew Webb, "undated". "One Sided Matching: Choice Selection With Rival Uncertain Outcomes," Working Papers 2015-12, Department of Economics, University of Calgary, revised 09 Jul 2015.
  • Handle: RePEc:clg:wpaper:2015-12
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    File URL: https://econ.ucalgary.ca/sites/econ.ucalgary.ca.manageprofile/files/unitis/publications/1-6355182/Johnson_Webb-Choice.pdf
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    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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