Asymmetric Information, Long Term Labor Contracts, Inefficient Job Separations
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 276.
Date of creation: 01 Nov 1982
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1981. "Implicit Contracts, Moral Hazard, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 301-07, May.
- Feldstein, Martin S, 1976. "Temporary Layoffs in the Theory of Unemployment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(5), pages 937-57, October.
- Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-84, December.
- Hall, Robert E & Lazear, Edward P, 1984.
"The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(2), pages 233-57, April.
- Robert E. Hall & Edward P. Lazear, 1984. "The Excess Sensitivity of Layoffs and Quits to Demand," NBER Working Papers 0864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Azariadis, Costas, 1983. "Employment with Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 157-72, Supplemen.
- Lorne Carmichael, 1981.
"Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders,"
452, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Hashimoto, Masanori, 1979. "Bonus Payments, on-the-Job Training, and Lifetime Employment in Japan," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 1086-1104, October.
- Gielen, Anne & van Ours, Jan C, 2006.
"Why Do Worker-Firm Matches Dissolve?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
5739, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gielen, A. C. & Ours, J.C. van, 2006. "Why do Worker-Firm Matches Dissolve?," Discussion Paper 2006-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Gielen, Anne C. & van Ours, Jan C., 2006. "Why Do Worker-Firm Matches Dissolve?," IZA Discussion Papers 2165, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tim Kwok).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.