We develop a structural microeconomic model of urban travel demand. This model incorporates aversion to congestion by individuals and determines the degree of congestion endogenously. Each individual?s optimal travel decision depends on the travel decisions of others, such that in Nash equilibrium all individuals simultaneously decide on the number of trips.The model is estimated for optimal modes of transportation and optimal fares. It reveals the relevance of incomplete information in transportation markets. We also estimate a measure of the individuals' willingness to pay for gaining time in traffic.
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