Crime, Poverty and Police Corruption in Developing Countries
AbstractCrime and the fear of being hit by crime and small-scale violence are key economic and social problems in most developing countries, not least felt strongly by the poor. Extensive corruption in the police, experienced or perceived, contributes seriously to the problem. A key question raised in the paper is: How is police corruption linked to the wider processes of development - including crime, violence and poverty? The paper examines (i) how and why corruption may arise in the daily routines of the police and whether it may have impacts on crime rates; (ii) empirical indications of whether the police may be more corrupt than other groups of public officials; (iii) how and why police corruption may vary across countries; and (iv) the wider impacts of police corruption on development
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway in its series CMI Working Papers with number 7.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Corruption Crime Police Poverty JEL classification: D73; K42; O17;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Cor - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - - - -
- Cri - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - - - -
- Pol - Economic Systems - - - - -
- Pov - Economic Systems - - - - -
- JEL - Labor and Demographic Economics - - - - -
- cla - - - - - -
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- O17 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-07-20 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2008-07-20 (Development)
- NEP-LAM-2008-07-20 (Central & South America)
- NEP-LAW-2008-07-20 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-LTV-2008-07-20 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
- NEP-SOC-2008-07-20 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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- Cracau, Daniel & Franz, Benjamin, 2013. "Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 1-4.
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