The evolution of social norms
AbstractEvolutionary game theory provides the tools to analyze which strategies, or patterns of behaviour, emerge over time through a process of adaptation. Social norms can be defined as patterns of behaviour with certain characteristics. Evolutionary game theory thus provides one perspective on how social norms are formed and maintained. Prisoner's dilemma games can be used to study the conditions under which cooperative norms emerge. Bargaining games can be used to address the formation of fairness norms. However, being more congenial to analyzing norms that somehow focus on material payoffs, it is not a given that evolutionary game theory can adequately address norms focusing on rights or virtues.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway in its series CMI Working Papers with number WP 2003:1.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 2003
Date of revision:
Evolutionary game theory Social norms;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Urs Steiner Brandt, 2008. "What can facilitate cooperation: Fairness, ineaulity aversion, punishment, norms or trust?," Working Papers 80/08, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Espen Villanger, 2003. "Company interests and foreign aid policy: Playing donors out against each other," CMI Working Papers WP 2003:5, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
- Espen Villanger, 2004.
"Company Influence on Foreign Aid Disbursement: Is Conditionality Credible when Donors Have Mixed Motives?,"
Southern Economic Journal,
Southern Economic Association, vol. 71(2), pages 334-351, October.
- Espen Villanger, 2003. "Company influence on foreign aid disbursement: Is conditionality credible when donors have mixed motives?," CMI Working Papers WP 2003:4, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Robert Sjursen).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.