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Exclusion par manipulation des marchés des permis d’emission

Author

Listed:
  • Sonia Schwartz

    (CERGAM-CAE, Aix-Marseille Université)

Abstract

Cet article traite de l’exclusion par manipulation des marchés de permis d’émission. Dans un premier temps, nous déterminons la va- leur de l’exclusion contenue dans le permis. Puis, nous définissons la stratégie de sur-achat des permis et évaluons son impact sur le prix du permis. Nous en tirons alors un certain nombre de conclusions en termes de dotations initiales et de politique de la concurrence.

Suggested Citation

  • Sonia Schwartz, 2005. "Exclusion par manipulation des marchés des permis d’emission," CAE Working Papers 26, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
    • Handle: RePEc:cgm:wpaper:26
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    File URL: http://junon.u-3mrs.fr/afa10w21/RePEc/cgm/wpaper/DR_26_0506_schwartz.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2005
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sonia Schwartz & Hubert Stahn, 2014. "Competitive Permit Markets and Vertical Structures: The Relevance of Imperfectly Competitive Eco-Industries," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(1), pages 69-95, February.
    2. Julien Bueb & Sonia Schwartz, 2011. "Strategic manipulation of a pollution permit market and international trade," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 313-331, June.
    3. Bueb, Julien & Schwartz, Sonia, 2009. "Permis d’émission négociables et commerce international dans des marchés de concurrence imparfaite," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 85(3), pages 303-318, septembre.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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