IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_7903.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Legal and Economic Case for an Auction Reserve Price in the EU Emissions Trading System

Author

Listed:
  • Carolyn Fischer
  • Leonie Reins
  • Dallas Burtraw
  • David Langlet
  • Åsa Löfgren
  • Michael Mehling
  • Stefan Weishaar
  • Lars Zetterberg
  • Harro van Asselt
  • Kati Kulovesi

Abstract

When it was launched in 2005, the European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS) was projected to have prices of around €30/ton CO2 and to be a cornerstone of the EU’s climate policy. The reality was a cascade of falling prices, a ballooning privately held emissions bank, and a decade of low prices providing inadequate incentive to drive investment in the technologies and innovation necessary to achieve long-term climate goals. The European Commission responded with administrative measures, including postponing the introduction of allowances (backloading) and using a quantity-based criterion for regulating future allowance sales (the market stability reserve); although prices are beginning to recover, it is far from clear whether these measures will adequately support the price into the future. In the meantime, governments have been turning away from carbon pricing and adopting overlapping regulatory measures that reinforce low prices and further undermine the confidence in market-based approaches to addressing climate change. The solution in other carbon markets has been the introduction of a reserve price that would set a minimum price in allowance auctions. Opponents of an auction reserve price in the EU ETS have expressed concern that a minimum auction price would interfere with economic operations in the market or would be tantamount to a tax, which would trigger a decision rule requiring unanimity among EU Member States. This Article reviews the economic and legal arguments for and against an auction reserve price. Our economic analysis concludes that an auction reserve price is necessary to accommodate overlapping policies and for the allowance market to operate efficiently. Our legal analysis concludes that an auction reserve price is not a “provision primarily of a fiscal nature,” nor would it “significantly affect a Member State’s choice between different energy sources.” We describe pathways through which a reserve price could be introduced.

Suggested Citation

  • Carolyn Fischer & Leonie Reins & Dallas Burtraw & David Langlet & Åsa Löfgren & Michael Mehling & Stefan Weishaar & Lars Zetterberg & Harro van Asselt & Kati Kulovesi, 2019. "The Legal and Economic Case for an Auction Reserve Price in the EU Emissions Trading System," CESifo Working Paper Series 7903, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7903
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/cesifo1_wp7903.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hintermayer, Martin, 2020. "A Carbon Price Floor in the Reformed EU ETS: Design Matters!," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224576, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    2. Hintermayer, Martin, 2020. "A Carbon Price Floor in the Reformed EU ETS: Design matters!," EWI Working Papers 2020-3, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).
    3. Hintermayer, Martin, 2020. "A carbon price floor in the reformed EU ETS: Design matters!," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    emissions trading; auction reserve price; carbon tax; price floor; EU law;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_7903. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Klaus Wohlrabe (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cesifde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.