Marina Moreira da Gama (Cedeplar-UFMG) Marco Antônio Ribas Cavalieri (Cedeplar-UFMG)
Abstract
The paper’s purpose is to investigate and to criticize the quantitative method used by antitrust authorities to analyze mergers unilateral effects. Until the nineties the method used by antitrust authorities was discretionary, based on a structural analysis of the market or the relevant market delimitation and the possibility of market power. Recently, the antitrust authorities have implemented a new method, called ‘merger simulation’ or the use of an oligopoly model with a demand system that predict the post merger prices and outputs. The problems with this new method are that two: these inherent implications, such that i) the dependence on the inherent curvature properties of the demand system; ii) the assumption that marginal cost does not vary in the relevant range; iii) the simplicity of the static oligopoly model; iv) the absence of market structural change as a consequence of the merger; and the relationship that this new method made with the variables structure and performance, like the questionable structuralism theory.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Length: 29 pages Date of creation: Aug 2006 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:cdp:texdis:td295
Contact details of provider: Postal: Cedeplar-FACE-UFMG Av. Antonio Carlos, 6627 Belo Horizonte, MG 31270-901 Brazil Phone: 55-31-3409-7100 Fax: +55 31 3201-3657 Email: Web page: http://www.cedeplar.ufmg.br More information through EDIRC
Order Information: Postal: Cedeplar-FACE-UFMG Av. Antonio Carlos, 6627 Belo Horizonte, MG 31270-901 Brazil
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Hugo E. A. da Gama Cerqueira).
Find related papers by JEL classification: L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: