Some Economic Consequences of India's Institutions of Governance: A Conceptual Framework
AbstractThis paper examines the functioning of some of Indiaâ€™s institutions of governance, namely, the legislative and executive branches of government, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy, from an instrumental, economic perspective. Governance is analyzed along three dimensions: (1) the degree of commitment or durability of laws and rules, (2) the degree of enforcement of these laws, and (3) the degree of decentralization of jurisdictions with respect to local public goods. It is suggested that India's experience of governance reflects insufficiencies in all three dimensions: of durability, enforcement, and decentralization, with adverse consequences for economic efficiency. The paper concludes with a brief normative discussion of collective action in general, and alternative structures of institutions of governance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz in its series Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt94r0j02t.
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2003
Date of revision:
governance; commitment; durability; enforcement; decentralization;
Other versions of this item:
- Singh, Nirvikar, 2003. "Some Economic Consequences of India's Institutions of Governance: A Conceptual Framework," Santa Cruz Center for International Economics, Working Paper Series qt94r0j02t, Center for International Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
- Singh, Nirvikar, 2003. "Some Economic Consequences of India's Institutions of Governance: A Conceptual Framework," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9jk1j8m1, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
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- Singh, Nirvikar, 2008. "Holding India together: The role of institutions of federalism," MPRA Paper 12432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Ahsan, Reshad N., 2013. "Input tariffs, speed of contract enforcement, and the productivity of firms in India," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 181-192.
- Singh, Nirvikar, 2008.
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- Singh, Nirvikar, 2009. "India's Development Strategy: Accidents, Design and Replicability," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
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