Contracting Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt6s15h2jc.
Date of creation: 01 May 1991
Date of revision:
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incomplete contracts; renegotiations; remedies for breach contract; Business; Social and Behavioral Sciences; Business and Corporate Communications;
Other versions of this item:
- Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz., 1991. "Contracting Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach," Economics Working Papers 91-165, University of California at Berkeley.
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