Suggestions for the Road to Copenhagen
AbstractWe provide a unified discussion of the issues that confront negotiators of the next international climate agreement. We offer a novel proposal that entitles countries to discharge their treaty obligations by paying a â€œfineâ€. This escape clause provides cost insurance, simplifies the problem of enforcing compliance, and increases incentives to participate in the agreement. We explain why developed country obligations should rely on a cap and trade commitment rather than carbon taxes. A Central Bank maintains stability of carbon prices by defending a price ceiling and floor. An so-called intensity target is not a good alternative to an emissions cap. Modest trade restrictions, consistent with WTO law, will form an important part of the next agreement. Developed and developing countries have differentiated responsibilities. Developing countries do not adopt binding targets at the next round of negotiations, but they accept the principle of binding targets in the subsequent agreement, beginning in the early 2020s. Developed country participation relies on a reformed CDM and sectoral agreements that are financed by the sale of emissions permits.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley in its series Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series with number qt3nj4h7k2.
Date of creation: 22 May 2009
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Kyoto protocol; escape clause; emissions trade; taxes versus cap and trade; price stability; carbon leakage; trade restrictions; differentiated responsibility; clean development mechanism; sectoral agreements; Life Sciences;
Other versions of this item:
- Karp, Larry & Zhao, Jinhua, 2009. "Suggestions for the road to Copenhagen," CUDARE Working Paper Series 1085, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
- Karp, Larry & Zhao, Jinhua, 2009. "Suggestions for the Road to Copenhagen," CUDARE Working Paper Series 1085, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
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- De Cian, Enrica & Tavoni, Massimo, 2012. "Do technology externalities justify restrictions on emission permit trading?," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(4), pages 624-646.
- Nicole A. MATHYS & Jaime de MELO, 2010.
"Trade and Climate Change: The Challenges Ahead,"
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