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Cartel Organization and Antitrust Enforcement

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Author Info

  • Zhijun

    ()
    (ESRC Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)

Abstract

This paper incorporates the economic theory of organizations into the framework of public law enforcement, and characterizes the dual-coalition structure of cartel organization that allows us to highlight the strategic interactions between cartel participants under different antitrust policies. We show that delegation of authorities over collusive decisions from top executives to subordinates can mitigate the temptation of renege on collusive relationships and thus contributes to facilitating collusion. This result parallels the insights in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002, 2006) which find that the optimal allocation of decision rights is to minimize the maximum temptation to renege on relational contracts. Moreover, the efficiency gains of delegation in facilitating collusion can be mitigated when the corporate leniency program is introduced, in particular whenever it is unlikely to detect cartels absent leniency and the corporate liability is muc more significant than individual liability.

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File URL: http://www.ccp.uea.ac.uk/publicfiles/workingpapers/CCP08-21.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia in its series Working Papers with number 08-21.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp08-21

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Related research

Keywords: cartel organization; antitrust enforcement; leniency programs;

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Cited by:
  1. Aubert, C├ęcile, 2009. "Managerial Effort Incentives and Market Collusion," TSE Working Papers 09-127, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

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