Price Transparency and Consumer Naivety in a Competitive Market
AbstractDespite intense price competition firms obfuscate product information when it is relatively costless to reveal, contrary to neoclassical predictions. This paper considers whether firms can profitably conceal (part of) their prices for a homogeneous product when consumers differ in their ability to form expectations of market prices. The model shows that the ability to conceal prices but still attract naïve consumers dampens competition and allows prices to be set above marginal cost. This suggests that the European Commission was correct to pass regulations that require airlines to set prices inclusive of taxes, fees and charges, because alternative policies of educating a proportion of naïve consumers to become sophisticated or assisting consumers to search the market more effectively could increase prices in some situations.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia in its series Working Papers with number 07-10.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision:
bounded rationality; obfuscation; price transparency;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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- Chris M. Wilson, 2008.
"Ordered Search and Equilibrium Obfuscation,"
Economics Series Working Papers
401, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Joel Slemrod, 2010.
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Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 66(1), pages 15-33, March.
- Joel Slemrod, 2009. "Old George Orwell Got it Backward: Some Thoughts on Behavioral Tax Economics," CESifo Working Paper Series 2777, CESifo Group Munich.
- Kaminski, Bogumil & Latek, Maciej, 2012. "A Simple Model of Bertrand Duopoly with Noisy Prices," MPRA Paper 41333, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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