We develop a North-South model of international trade and transboundary pollution to analyze the relationship between environmental technology transfer and the South's incentive to sign an international environmental agreement (IEA). First, we show that technology transfer could either increase or reduce the South's incentive to sign the IEA. Second, we show that the South's participation in the IEA would reduce the market incentive of technology transfer. Both results have very clear policy implications for (i) the sequence of technology transfer and the South's IEA membership and (ii) the legitimacy of South's subsidies for technology transfer.
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Paper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Economic Papers with number
03-01.
Find related papers by JEL classification: F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
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