Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Forest owners’ collective action against the risk of forest fire: a game theoretical approach

Contents:

Author Info

  • Américo M. S. Carvalho Mendes

    ()
    (Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa - Porto)

Abstract

This paper is a follow up on a earlier one (Mendes, 1998) where I proposed a series of models for forest owners associations represented as organisation made up of two groups of strategically interacting players: the forest owners who are members of the association and the board of directors they have elected. The directors decide on the amount of services provided by the association which can be public goods (collective representation of the members, promotion of their common interests, diffusion of general information about forest programmes and best forest management practices, etc.) and private goods and services (silvicultural works preventive of forest fires, technical advice, etc.). The models were set up as games in strategic form with complete information and no payoff uncertainty. Here I pick up the second of, what is called in that previous paper, the "Portuguese" models and extend it in the following directions: - there is payoff risk for the forest owners due to exogenous hazards (forest fires or others); - forest owners can buy private services from the owners which contribute to reduce the losses resulting from those hazards. The main focus in this paper is to derive the comparative static results about the demand of these private services by the forest owners.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.porto.ucp.pt/feg/repec/WP/022007-Am%C3%A9rico%20Mendes%20-%20Forest%20owners%20collective%20action2.pdf
File Function: First version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto) in its series Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) with number 02.

as in new window
Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cap:wpaper:022007

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Rua Diogo Botelho, 1327; 4169 - 005 Porto
Phone: +351 226 196 200
Fax: +351 226 196 291
Web page: http://www.feg.porto.ucp.pt/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: forest owners’ associations; public and private goods joint supply; game theory;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cap:wpaper:022007. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ricardo Goncalves).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.