‘Unfair’ Discrimination in Two-sided Peering? Evidence from LINX
AbstractDoes asymmetry between Internet Providers affect the “fairness” of their interconnection contracts? While recent game theoretic literature provides contrasting answers to this question, there is a lack of empirical research. We introduce a novel dataset on micro-interconnection policies and provide an econometric analysis of the determinants of peering decisions amongst the Internet Service Providers interconnecting at the London Internet Exchange Point (LINX). Our key result shows that two different metrics, introduced to capture asymmetry, exert opposite effects. Asymmetry in “market size” enhances the quality of the link, while asymmetry in “network centrality” induces quality degradation, hence “unfairer” interconnection conditions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0621.
Date of creation: Feb 2006
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Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm
Internet Peering; Two-sided Markets; Network Industries; Antitrust;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
- C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-03-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-03-05 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-MIC-2006-03-05 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2006-03-05 (Network Economics)
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