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Beyond Regulation

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Author Info

  • Littlechild, S.

Abstract

The ‘standard model’ of electricity reform has been refined in many countries but not extended to others. Government is supplanting the role of regulation. Revised calculations suggest that the benefits of UK electricity privatisation were higher than previously estimated and more widely shared with consumers. Other calculations suggest that generation market power in the US is less than previously estimated by Lerner index calculations. Unduly tight price controls explain why there has been less customer switching in some residential electricity markets. There has been significant development of fixed price contracts in Nordic markets, posing questions for regulation in the absence of retail competition. There are alternatives to regulation of network monopolies. In Australia regulated interconnectors have been less economic than merchant interconnectors. In Argentina arrangements for users to determine transmission expansions have worked well. In Florida negotiated settlements have secured a better deal for customers than regulation.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 0616.

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Length: 23
Date of creation: Feb 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cam:camdae:0616

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Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm

Related research

Keywords: : regulation; competition; electricity; transmission;

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Cited by:
  1. Perez, Yannick & Ramos Real, Francisco Javier, 2008. "How to make a European integrated market in small and isolated electricity systems? The case of the Canary Islands," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 4159-4167, November.
  2. Dierk Bauknecht, 2011. "Incentive Regulation and Network Innovations," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/02, European University Institute.
  3. Christian von Hirschhausen & Hannes Weigt, 2007. "Aktive Wettbewerbspolitik für effiziente Elektrizitätserzeugungsmärkte: Instrumente, internationale Erfahrungen und wirtschaftspolitische Schlussfolgerungen," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 76(1), pages 65-86.

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