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Securities Fraud Class Actions and Corporate Governance: New Evidence on the Role of Merit

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Author Info
Christopher F. Baum () (Boston College)
James G. Bohn (UHY Advisors)
Atreya Chakraborty () (University of Massachusetts-Boston)

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Abstract

We examine the relationship between outcomes of securities fraud class action lawsuits and board turnover rates. Our results indicate that the outcome of a class action is a good indicator of the underlying, unobservable merit of the action. Consistent with the merit hypothesis, board turnover rates are higher in the period following the filing of a lawsuit that is ultimately settled than one that is dismissed. Turnover propensities are more sensitive to outcome for CEOs and for individuals named as defendants in the lawsuits. Turnover rates of both inside and outside directors are higher when external equity ownership is more concentrated.

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File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/EC-P/WP664.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 664.

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Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: 28 Apr 2007
Date of revision: 02 Jan 2008
Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:664

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Related research
Keywords: Securities fraud class actions board turnover corporate governance

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Corporation and Securities Law

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Goyal, Vidhan K. & Park, Chul W., 2002. "Board leadership structure and CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 49-66, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2008-7-19.


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