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Signatured Deep Fictitious Play for Mean Field Games with Common Noise

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  • Ming Min
  • Ruimeng Hu

Abstract

Existing deep learning methods for solving mean-field games (MFGs) with common noise fix the sampling common noise paths and then solve the corresponding MFGs. This leads to a nested-loop structure with millions of simulations of common noise paths in order to produce accurate solutions, which results in prohibitive computational cost and limits the applications to a large extent. In this paper, based on the rough path theory, we propose a novel single-loop algorithm, named signatured deep fictitious play, by which we can work with the unfixed common noise setup to avoid the nested-loop structure and reduce the computational complexity significantly. The proposed algorithm can accurately capture the effect of common uncertainty changes on mean-field equilibria without further training of neural networks, as previously needed in the existing machine learning algorithms. The efficiency is supported by three applications, including linear-quadratic MFGs, mean-field portfolio game, and mean-field game of optimal consumption and investment. Overall, we provide a new point of view from the rough path theory to solve MFGs with common noise with significantly improved efficiency and an extensive range of applications. In addition, we report the first deep learning work to deal with extended MFGs (a mean-field interaction via both the states and controls) with common noise.

Suggested Citation

  • Ming Min & Ruimeng Hu, 2021. "Signatured Deep Fictitious Play for Mean Field Games with Common Noise," Papers 2106.03272, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2106.03272
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2106.03272
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jiequn Han & Ruimeng Hu & Jihao Long, 2020. "Convergence of Deep Fictitious Play for Stochastic Differential Games," Papers 2008.05519, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
    2. Ruimeng Hu & Thaleia Zariphopoulou, 2021. "$N$-player and Mean-field Games in It\^{o}-diffusion Markets with Competitive or Homophilous Interaction," Papers 2106.00581, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2021.
    3. Jiequn Han & Ruimeng Hu, 2019. "Deep Fictitious Play for Finding Markovian Nash Equilibrium in Multi-Agent Games," Papers 1912.01809, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2020.
    4. Daniel Lacker & Thaleia Zariphopoulou, 2019. "Mean field and n‐agent games for optimal investment under relative performance criteria," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(4), pages 1003-1038, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yichen Feng & Ming Min & Jean-Pierre Fouque, 2022. "Deep Learning for Systemic Risk Measures," Papers 2207.00739, arXiv.org.
    2. Xiaofei Shi & Daran Xu & Zhanhao Zhang, 2023. "Deep learning algorithms for hedging with frictions," Digital Finance, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 113-147, March.
    3. Ming Min & Tomoyuki Ichiba, 2023. "Convolutional signature for sequential data," Digital Finance, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 3-28, March.
    4. Erhan Bayraktar & Qi Feng & Zhaoyu Zhang, 2022. "Deep Signature Algorithm for Multi-dimensional Path-Dependent Options," Papers 2211.11691, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
    5. Christa Cuchiero & Philipp Schmocker & Josef Teichmann, 2023. "Global universal approximation of functional input maps on weighted spaces," Papers 2306.03303, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.

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