Inflation and unemployment in OECD countries: The role of political ideologies, Central Bank independance and industrial relations
AbstractThis paper considers the effects of central bank independence, labor market institutions and the political partisanship on economic performance. In particular, we test if the partisanship of the government and the degree of central bank independence affect the relationship between labor market institutions and economic performance. We find evidence of interaction effects between the government’s partisanship and the labor market institutions. An increase in union density favors a left-wing government, while an increase in coordination favors a right-wing government. We also find that changes in the partisanship of the government have a larger impact on inflation and unemployment when the labor market is more institutionalized.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Antwerp, Faculty of Applied Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2003001.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2003
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-01-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2005-01-02 (Central Banking)
- NEP-LAB-2005-01-02 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2005-01-02 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2005-01-02 (Monetary Economics)
- NEP-POL-2005-01-02 (Positive Political Economics)
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