An Examination Of Different Types Of Adverse Selection In Federal Crop Insurance
AbstractDifferent types of adverse selection-type of insurance product, type of unit, type of coverage and number of actual yields reported in Federal crop insurance is examined utilizing binomial and ordered logit discrete choice models for all U.S. cotton producers, 1997-2000. The associated costs of adverse selection in U.S. cotton range from $32 Million to $359 Million for the four-year period.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Western Agricultural Economics Association in its series 2002 Annual Meeting, July 28-31, 2002, Long Beach, California with number 36649.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Risk and Uncertainty;
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