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Incentives in R&D markets: Analysing the relation between the elasticities of patent values and the optimality of patent policy

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  • Meller Leandro Matías

Abstract

The objective of this article is to analyse the relation between the conditions for the optimality of patent policy and the elasticities of the social and private values of innovation. It is also an objective to study the influence of the coexistence of independent innovations and the cumulative nature of innovation in such conditions. Three models have been proposed: the first one textcite{takalo2001} represents a scenario with an isolated innovation, the second one features two independent innovations, and the third model features two linked innovations, one of which is a ``research tool'' for the development and the introduction of the other one. Sufficient conditions for the optimality of patents with maximum breadth or infinite length were presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Meller Leandro Matías, 2023. "Incentives in R&D markets: Analysing the relation between the elasticities of patent values and the optimality of patent policy," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4669, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
    • Handle: RePEc:aep:anales:4669
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rockett, Katharine, 2010. "Property Rights and Invention," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 315-380, Elsevier.
    2. Tuomas Takalo, 2001. "On the optimal patent policy," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 33-40, Spring.
    3. Tandon, Pankaj, 1982. "Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(3), pages 470-486, June.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital
    • K3 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law

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