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Report NEP-CTA-2008-12-01
This is the archive for NEP-CTA , a report on new working papers in the area of Contract Theory & Applications. Simona Fabrizi issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.Subscribe to this report: email or RSS Other reports in NEP-CTA
The following items were anounced in this report:
Helmut Bester & Daniel Krähmer, 2008.
"Exit Options in Incomplete Contracts with Asymmetric Information ,"
Discussion Papers
251, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
[Downloadable!] Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2008.
"Competitive Markets without Commitment ,"
Working Papers
0814, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute.
[Downloadable!] Nicolas Gruyer, 2008.
"Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...") ,"
Economics Working Papers
06, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
[Downloadable!] Gill, David & Sgroi, Daniel, 2008.
"The Optimal Choice of Pre-launch Reviewer : How Best to Transmit Information using Tests and Conditional Pricing ,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
877, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Renaud Bourlès, 2008.
"Moral Hazard In Dynamic Insurance Classification Risk And Prepayment ,"
Working Papers
halshs-00340830_v1, HAL.
[Downloadable!] Antonio Cabrales & Piero Gottardi, 2008.
"Markets for Information: Of Inefficient Firewalls and Efficient Monopolies ,"
Working Papers
2008_37, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Feess, Eberhard & Gerfin, Michael & Muehlheusser, Gerd, 2008.
"Contracts as Rent Seeking Devices: Evidence from German Soccer ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3834, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!] This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .