Competitive Markets without Commitment
AbstractIn the presence of a time-inconsistency problem with optimal agency contracts, we show that competitive markets implement allocations that Pareto dominate those achieved by a benevolent planner, they induce strictly more effort, and they sometimes make the commitment problem disappear entirely. In particular, we analyze a model with moral hazard and two-sided lack of commitment. After agents have chosen a hidden effort and the need to provide incentives has vanished, firms can modify their contracts and agents can switch firms. As long as the ex-post market outcome satisfies a weak notion of competitiveness and sufficiently separates individuals who choose different effort levels, the market allocation is Pareto superior to a social planner’s allocation. We construct a specific market game that naturally generates robust equilibria with these properties. In addition, we show that equilibrium contracts without commitment are identical to those with full commitment if the latter involve no cross-subsidization between individuals who choose different effort levels.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute in its series Working Papers with number 0814.
Length: 65 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: forthcoming in Journal of Political Economy
Time-Inconsistency; Moral Hazard; Competitive Markets; Adverse Selection;
Other versions of this item:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2008-12-01 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2008-12-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2008-12-01 (Contract Theory & Applications)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2013.
"Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
9419, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2012. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening and Multitasking," IDEI Working Papers 756, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2012. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening and Multitasking," IAST Working Papers 12.03, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
- Benabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2013. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking," IZA Discussion Papers 7321, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2013. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking," NBER Working Papers 18936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bénabou, Roland & Tirole, Jean, 2012. "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening and Multitasking," TSE Working Papers 12-367, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Mar 2013.
- Maurus Rischatsch, 2009. "Simulating WTP Values from Random-Coefficient Models," Working Papers 0912, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute.
- Englmaier, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas, 2010.
"Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
7914, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Englmaier, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas, 2010. "Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent Is Free to Leave," IZA Discussion Papers 5027, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Englmaier, Florian & Muehlheusser, Gerd & Roider, Andreas, 2010. "Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 329, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Jenny Simon, 2011. "Financial Markets as a Commitment Device for the Government," 2011 Meeting Papers 447, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Ilja Neustadt & Peter Zweifel, 2009. "Economic Well-Being, Social Mobility, and Preferences for Income Redistribution: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment," Working Papers 0909, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Jan 2010.
- Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2010.
"Competitive screening in insurance markets with endogenous wealth heterogeneity,"
Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 187-211, August.
- Nick Netzer & Florian Scheuer, 2009. "Competitive Screening in Insurance Markets with Endogenous Wealth Heterogeneity," Working Papers 0907, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute, revised Jun 2009.
- Maurus Rischatsch & Maria Trottmann, 2009. "Physician dispensing and the choice between generic and brand-name drugs – Do margins affect choice?," Working Papers 0911, University of Zurich, Socioeconomic Institute.
- Wanda Mimra & Achim Wambach, 2011. "A Game-Theoretic Foundation for the Wilson Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Adverse Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series 3412, CESifo Group Munich.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marita Kieser).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.