The Unfccc Process: An Economic And Game Theoretic Interpretation

The following sections are included:The purpose and the messageIntroductionFrom science to policy and diplomacyThe United Nations framework convention on climate change, Rio 1992The Kyoto Protocol, 1997Main features of the ProtocolEconomic and game theoretic ideas supporting the ProtocolThe cap and trade scheme in the reference modelEfficiency and coalitional stability: A reminder on the role of transfersCompetitive emissions trading in lieu of transfersAgreeing on reference emissionsShowing the efficiency and coalitional stability of the trading equilibriumDesirability of free trade in emissionsJI and CDM as alternative forms of emissions tradingAppraising the first commitment period: 2005–2012Game theoretic interpretation of the post-ratification situationThe appropriate solution conceptOn efficiency and coalitional stability of the prevailing situationOn caps and tradesReflections in the wake of Kyoto, as of 2012The sequence of time intervalsThe playersThe nature of strategiesEmissions abatement vs. temperature changeA fragmented vs. global world climate regime?The participation of developing countriesConcluding consideration on the Kyoto ProtocolThe Durban ADP, the Doha amendment and the second commitment period: 2013–2020The Paris agreement of December 2015 (COP 21)The grand coalition in sight?On strategiesStretching the nature of strategies?Changing the source of strategiesImplementing strategies: Stocktake, naming and shamingOn outcomesEquilibrium with subscriptionPCNEs, climate clubs and little creeksOn dynamicsOn mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, and transfersOn carbon pricing as an instrument relegated to “voluntary cooperation”Concluding consideration on the Paris AgreementA conclusion for the course