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Veto Player Theory and Policy Change: An Introduction

In: Reform Processes and Policy Change

Author

Listed:
  • George Tsebelis

    (University of Michigan)

Abstract

Some months ago I had the honor to be invited to Mannheim for a conference organized by Thomas Koenig and Marc Debus. The subject matter was “Reform Processes and Policy Change,” and the organizers thought that my book Veto Players would be a good starting point for their study. I thought that the conference was an excellent idea, particularly since the reputation of Mannheim on policy studies is outstanding. Little did I know that this would be only a first step, because they now have received an interdisciplinary multimillion grant from the German Government (SFB 884) to “Political Economy of Reforms”

Suggested Citation

  • George Tsebelis, 2011. "Veto Player Theory and Policy Change: An Introduction," Studies in Public Choice, in: Thomas König & Marc Debus & George Tsebelis (ed.), Reform Processes and Policy Change, edition 1, chapter 0, pages 3-18, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-1-4419-5809-9_1
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-5809-9_1
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    Cited by:

    1. Oscar Calvo-Gonz'alez & Axel Eizmendi & Germ'an Reyes, 2022. "The Shifting Attention of Political Leaders: Evidence from Two Centuries of Presidential Speeches," Papers 2209.00540, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
    2. Fabio Padovano & Ilaria Petrarca, 2013. "When and how politicians take ‘scandalous’ decisions?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 24(4), pages 336-351, December.

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