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The Achievement of Electricity Competitive Reforms: A Governance Structure Problem?

In: Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation

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  • Jean-Michel Glachant
  • Yannick Perez

Abstract

Building on Oliver Williamson’s original analysis, the contributors introduce new ideas, different perspectives and provide tools for better understanding changes in the approach to regulation, the reform of public utilities, and the complex problems of governance. They draw largely upon a transaction cost approach, highlighting the challenges faced by major economic sectors and identifying critical flaws in prevailing views on regulation. Deeply rooted in sector analysis, the book conveys a central message of new institutional economics: that theory should be continuously confronted by facts, and reformed or revolutionized accordingly.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Michel Glachant & Yannick Perez, 2009. "The Achievement of Electricity Competitive Reforms: A Governance Structure Problem?," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard & Michel Ghertman (ed.), Regulation, Deregulation, Reregulation, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:13188_9
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    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781847209689.00019.xml
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Fatras, Nicolas & Ma, Zheng & Duan, Hongbo & Jørgensen, Bo Nørregaard, 2022. "A systematic review of electricity market liberalisation and its alignment with industrial consumer participation: A comparison between the Nordics and China," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 167(C).
    2. P Codani & Marc Petit & Yannick Perez, 2018. "Innovation et règles inefficaces : le cas des véhicules électriques," Post-Print halshs-01980639, HAL.
    3. Thompson, Andrew W. & Perez, Yannick, 2020. "Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) energy services, value streams, and regulatory policy implications," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    4. J-M- Glachant & H. Khalfallah & Y. Perez & V. Rious & M. Saguan, 2013. "Implementing Incentive Regulation and Regulatory Alignment with Resource Bounded Regulators," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, Intersentia, vol. 14(3), pages 265-291, September.
    5. Roques, Fabien & Finon, Dominique, 2017. "Adapting electricity markets to decarbonisation and security of supply objectives: Toward a hybrid regime?," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 584-596.
    6. Mustafa Durakoglu, S., 2011. "Political institutions of electricity regulation: The case of Turkey," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 5578-5587, September.
    7. Richard Meade & Seini O’Connor, 2011. "Comparison of Long-term Contracts and Vertical Integration in Decentralized Electricity Markets," Chapters, in: Jean-Michel Glachant & Dominique Finon & Adrien de Hauteclocque (ed.), Competition, Contracts and Electricity Markets, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Borne, Olivier & Korte, Klaas & Perez, Yannick & Petit, Marc & Purkus, Alexandra, 2018. "Barriers to entry in frequency-regulation services markets: Review of the status quo and options for improvements," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 81(P1), pages 605-614.
    9. Gustavo A. Marrero & Yannick Perez & Marc Petit & Francisco Javier Ramos-Real, 2015. "Electric vehicle fleet contributions for isolated systems. The case of the Canary Islands," International Journal of Automotive Technology and Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 15(2), pages 171-193.
    10. S. Mustafa Durakoglu, 2011. "Political Endowments and Electricity Market Regulation in Turkey: An Institutional Analysis," RSCAS Working Papers 2011/08, European University Institute.
    11. Jean-Michel Glachant & Haikel Khalfallah & Yannick Perez & Vincent Rious & Marcelo Saguan, 2013. "Implementing incentive regulation through an alignment with resource bounded regulators," Post-Print halshs-00767872, HAL.

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