Game theory and experimental gaming
In: Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications
AbstractThis is a survey and discussion of work covering both formal game theory and experimental gaming prior to 1991. It is a useful preliminary introduction to the considerable change and emphasis which has taken place since that time where dynamics, learning, and local optimization have challenged the concept of noncooperative equilibria.
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