This chapter surveys a class of solution concepts for n-person games without transferable utility -- NTU games for short -- that are based on varying notions of "fair division". An NTU game is a specification of payoffs attainable by members of each coalition through some joint course of action. The players confront the problem of choosing a payoff or solution that is feasible for the group as a whole. This is a bargaining problem and its solution may be reasonably required to satisfy various criteria, and different sets of rules or axioms will characterize different solutions or classes of solutions. For transferable utility games, the main axiomatic solution is the Shapley Value and this chapter deals with values of NTU games, i.e., solutions for NTU games that coincide with the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. We survey axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley NTU value, the Harsanyi solution, the Egalitarian solution and the non-symmetric generalizations of each. In addition, we discuss approaches to some of these solutions using the notions of potential and consistency for NTU games with finitely many as well as infinitely many players.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Publisher Info
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
plain text,
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF This chapter was published in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.) Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, , chapter 55, pages 2077-2120, 2002.