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John Yiran Zhu

Personal Details

First Name:John
Middle Name:Yiran
Last Name:Zhu
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pzh923
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/johnyiranzhu
Terminal Degree: (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Kansas

Lawrence, Kansas (United States)
http://economics.ku.edu/
RePEc:edi:deuksus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. John Y. Zhu, 2023. "Interventions Against Machine-Assisted Statistical Discrimination," Papers 2310.04585, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
  2. Hyuncheol Bryant Kim & Hyunseob Kim & John Zhu, 2022. "The Selection Effects of Part-Time Work: Experimental Evidence from a Large-Scale Recruitment Drive," Working Paper Series WP 2022-51, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
  3. Ifft, Jennifer & Li, Wen & Raszap Skorbiansky, Sharon & Rosch, Stephanie & Zhu, John Yiran, 2019. "Marketing Contracts and Crop Insurance for Specialty Crop Growers," SCC-76 Meeting, 2019, April 4-6, Kansas City, Missouri 288102, SCC-76: Economics and Management of Risk in Agriculture and Natural Resources.
  4. John Zhu & Marcus Opp, 2014. "Impatience vs. incentives," 2014 Meeting Papers 125, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Goldstein, Itay & Edmans, Alex & Zhu, John, 2013. "Contracting With Synergies," CEPR Discussion Papers 9559, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Articles

  1. Jennifer Ifft & Todd H. Kuethe & Gregory Lyons & Alexander Schultz & John Y. Zhu, 2024. "Crop insurance's impact on commercial bank loan volumes: Theory and evidence," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 46(1), pages 318-337, March.
  2. John Y Zhu, 2022. "Anticipating Disagreement in Dynamic Contracting [An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 26(5), pages 1241-1265.
  3. John Y. Zhu, 2022. "The fractional multidimensional knapsack problem: solution and uniqueness," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 10(1), pages 95-103, May.
  4. John Y. Zhu, 2018. "A Foundation for Efficiency Wage Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 248-288, November.
  5. John Y Zhu, 2018. "Myopic Agency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(2), pages 1352-1388.
  6. Marcus M. Opp & John Y. Zhu, 2015. "Impatience versus Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(4), pages 1601-1617, July.
  7. John Y. Zhu, 2013. "Optimal Contracts with Shirking," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(2), pages 812-839.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Goldstein, Itay & Edmans, Alex & Zhu, John, 2013. "Contracting With Synergies," CEPR Discussion Papers 9559, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Kelly Huang & Brent Lao & Gregory McPhee, 2020. "Internal information quality and patent‐related innovation," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3-4), pages 489-518, March.
    2. Bloomfield, Matthew & Gipper, Brandon & Kepler, John D. & Tsui, David, 2021. "Cost shielding in executive bonus plans," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2).
    3. Holger M. Mueller & Paige P. Ouimet & Elena Simintzi, 2017. "Within-Firm Pay Inequality," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 30(10), pages 3605-3635.
    4. Guay, Wayne R. & Kepler, John D. & Tsui, David, 2019. "The role of executive cash bonuses in providing individual and team incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(2), pages 441-471.
    5. Xie, Yimei & Ding, Chuan & Li, Yang & Wang, Kaihong, 2023. "Optimal incentive contract in continuous time with different behavior relationships between agents," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    6. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Lukyanov, Georgy & Shamruk, Konstantin & Su, Tong & Wakrim, Ahmed, 2022. "Public communication with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 177-196.
    8. Nian Yang & Jun Yang & Yu Chen, 2018. "Contracting in a Continuous-Time Model with Three-Sided Moral Hazard and Cost Synergies," Graz Economics Papers 2018-06, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    9. Meng Wei Chen & Yu Chen & Zhen-Hua Wu & Ningru Zhao, 2018. "Government Intervention, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship," Graz Economics Papers 2018-15, University of Graz, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. John Y. Zhu, 2018. "A Foundation for Efficiency Wage Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 248-288, November.

    Cited by:

  2. John Y Zhu, 2018. "Myopic Agency," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 85(2), pages 1352-1388.

    Cited by:

    1. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  3. Marcus M. Opp & John Y. Zhu, 2015. "Impatience versus Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(4), pages 1601-1617, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Eduardo Zilberman & Vinicius Carrasco & Pedro Hemsley, 2019. "Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 53-81, July.
    2. Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp, 2022. "The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 77(4), pages 2423-2470, August.
    3. Fong, Yuk-fai & Li, Jin, 2017. "Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 270-293.
    4. Edward D. Van Wesep & Brian Waters, 2022. "Bonus Season: A Theory of Periodic Labor Markets and Coordinated Bonuses," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 5464-5492, July.
    5. Doruk Cetemen & Felix Zhiyu Feng & Can Urgun, 2019. "Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting: Moral Hazard and Dynamic Inconsistency," Working Papers 2019-17, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    6. Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp & Florian Hoffmann, 2016. "Deferred compensation and risk-taking incentives," 2016 Meeting Papers 674, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus, 2019. "Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation," CEPR Discussion Papers 13643, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Felix Feng, 2018. "Dynamic Compensation under Uncertainty Shocks and Limited Commitment," 2018 Meeting Papers 159, Society for Economic Dynamics.

  4. John Y. Zhu, 2013. "Optimal Contracts with Shirking," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 80(2), pages 812-839.

    Cited by:

    1. Piskorski, Tomasz & Westerfield, Mark M., 2016. "Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 242-281.
    2. Grochulski, Borys & Zhang, Yuzhe, 2023. "Termination as an incentive device," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(1), January.
    3. Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2016. "Optimal Contracts with Reflection," Working Paper 16-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    4. Martin Szydlowski, 2014. "Incentives, Project Choice, and Dynamic Multitasking," 2014 Meeting Papers 1240, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Alexis Anagnostakis, 2023. "Pricing and hedging for a sticky diffusion," Papers 2311.17011, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2024.
    6. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
    7. Stephen Terry & Anastasia Zakolyukina & Toni Whited, 2018. "Information Distortion, R&D, and Growth," 2018 Meeting Papers 217, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Yu Huang & Nengjiu Ju & Hao Xing, 2023. "Performance Evaluation, Managerial Hedging, and Contract Termination," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(8), pages 4953-4971, August.
    9. Stephen J. Terry & Toni M. Whited & Anastasia A. Zakolyukina, 2022. "Information versus Investment," NBER Working Papers 29636, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Feng Tian & Peng Sun & Izak Duenyas, 2021. "Optimal Contract for Machine Repair and Maintenance," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 69(3), pages 916-949, May.
    11. Fong, Yuk-fai & Li, Jin, 2017. "Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 270-293.
    12. Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Westerfield, Mark M., 2021. "Dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 560-581.
    13. Jin Li & Arijit Mukherjee & Luis Vasconcelos, 2023. "What Makes Agility Fragile? A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Rigidity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(6), pages 3578-3601, June.
    14. Jean-Paul Décamps & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2019. "A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory," Post-Print halshs-02282092, HAL.
    15. Rui Li & Dana Kiku & Hengjie Ai, 2014. "A Mechanism Design Model of Firm Dynamics: The Case of Limited Commitment," 2014 Meeting Papers 855, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    16. Tak-Yuen Wong, 2019. "Dynamic Agency and Endogenous Risk-Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(9), pages 4032-4048, September.
    17. Mahmoud Sami Nabi, 2016. "Revisiting equity and debt: access to finance and economic inefficiency," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 63(4), pages 393-429, December.
    18. Rui Li, 2018. "Could Risk Management Be Harmful to Firms?," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 19(1), pages 247-263, May.
    19. Jianjun Miao & Alejandro Rivera, 2016. "Robust Contracts in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1405-1440, July.
    20. Rui Li & Kai Li & Hengjie Ai, 2017. "Moral Hazard and Investment-Cash-Flow Sensitivity," 2017 Meeting Papers 410, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    21. Wuming Fu & Qian Qi, 2023. "Artificial Intelligence and Dual Contract," Papers 2303.12350, arXiv.org.
    22. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    23. Peng Sun & Feng Tian, 2018. "Optimal Contract to Induce Continued Effort," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(9), pages 4193-4217, September.
    24. Rui Li & Mengying Wang, 2020. "Moral Hazard, Agency Cost, and Firm Growth," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 20(3), pages 639-664, September.
    25. Hansen, Peter G., 2022. "New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    26. Peter G. Hansen, 2021. "New Formulations of Ambiguous Volatility with an Application to Optimal Dynamic Contracting," Papers 2101.12306, arXiv.org.
    27. Li, Rui, 2017. "Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 74-91.
    28. Ai, Hengjie & Li, Rui, 2015. "Investment and CEO compensation under limited commitment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 452-472.
    29. Felix Feng, 2018. "Dynamic Compensation under Uncertainty Shocks and Limited Commitment," 2018 Meeting Papers 159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    30. Li, Jin & Mukherjee, Arijit & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2019. "Rulebooks in Relational Contracts," Working Papers 2019-7, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 5 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (3) 2011-11-28 2013-09-28 2014-06-02
  2. NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (3) 2013-09-28 2014-06-02 2022-12-05
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2011-11-28 2013-09-28 2014-06-02
  4. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (2) 2011-11-28 2013-09-28
  5. NEP-AGR: Agricultural Economics (1) 2019-05-13
  6. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2022-12-05
  7. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2013-09-28
  8. NEP-IAS: Insurance Economics (1) 2019-05-13
  9. NEP-LMA: Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, and Wages (1) 2022-12-05
  10. NEP-PPM: Project, Program and Portfolio Management (1) 2011-11-28

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